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Thursday, October 23, 2008
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SESSION I 9:25 - 10:30 |
Peer-to-Peer and Beyond CSE 305 |
Information Extraction CSE 403 |
Socially-Relevant Applications CSE 691 |
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SESSION II 10:40 - 11:30 |
Pacific Northwest Center for Neural Engineering CSE 305 |
Interacting with Interference CSE 403 |
Usable Security and Privacy CSE 691 |
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SESSION
III 11:40 - 12:30 |
Computing for Everyone CSE 305 |
The Many Faces of Concurrency CSE 403 |
Pictures, Games, and Movies CSE 691 |
In this work, we address this longstanding limitation by building a practical reverse traceroute tool. Our tool provides the same information as traceroute, but for the reverse path, and it works in the same case as traceroute, when the user may lack control of the destination. Our approach combines a number of ideas: source spoofing, IP timestamp and record route options, and multiple vantage points. Deploying our system on PlanetLab, we can determine the complete reverse route for more than 40% of cases. We use our reverse traceroute system to study previously unmeasurable aspects of the Internet: we uncover thousands of AS peering links invisible to current topology mapping efforts, and we present a case study of how a content provider could use our tool to troubleshoot poor performance.
We aim to construct a knowledge base of outstanding size to support inference, automatic question answering, faceted browsing, and potentially to bootstrap the Semantic Web.
Whereas previous work on TI (e.g., the literature on textual entailment) has been applied to paragraph-sized texts, Holmes utilizes knowledge-based model construction to scale TI to a corpus of 117 million Web pages. Given only a few minutes, Holmes doubles recall for example queries in three disparate domains (geography, business, and nutrition). Importantly, Holmes's runtime is linear in the size of its input corpus due to a surprising property of many textual relations in the Web corpus -- they are ``approximately'' functional in a well-defined sense.
Our real lives, on the other hand, are mostly semi-private: we share them with some people, but not others. We are developing a new method of social access control, where users devise a set of simple questions of shared knowledge to guard sets of social content instead of managing many black & white accounts, passwords, and access control lists. We implemented a prototype and conducted studies to explore the context of photo sharing security, gauge the difficulty of creating shared knowledge questions, measure their resilience to adversarial attack, and evaluate users' ability to understand and predict this resilience.
Recent research has proposed arbitrarily grouping dynamic memory operations into atomic blocks, in order to enforce memory ordering at a coarse grain. In addition to enforcing memory ordering, these techniques probabilistically survive atomicity violations by reducing the number of opportunities for interleaving of memory operations between executing threads. Building on this idea, Atom-Aid creates atomic blocks "intelligently" (rather than arbitrarily), dramatically reducing even further the probability that atomicity violations will occur. The technique pinpoints potential atomicity violations and executes them in an atomic block, thus providing reliable execution and debuggability. We evaluate Atom-Aid using buggy code from applications, including Apache, MySQL, and XMMS, showing that Atom-Aid virtually eliminates the manifestation of atomicity violations.
The goal of our research is to explore the CGRA space at the level of complete systems, including language, compiler, and architectural features. In this talk, we give a high level overview of our top-to- bottom tool-chain and look at flexibility in CGRAs using time-division multiplexing and resource sharing.
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