

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

# Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption

Fall 2016


Adam (Ada) Lerner

[lerner@cs.washington.edu](mailto:lerner@cs.washington.edu)

Thanks to Franz Roesner, Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

# Alice and Bob

- Archetypal characters



# Common Communication Security Goals


## Confidentiality of data:

Prevent exposure of information

## Integrity of data:

Prevent modification of information

**Authenticity** : Is this really Bob I'm talking to?




# History

- Substitution Ciphers
    - Caesar Cipher
  - Transposition Ciphers
  - Codebooks
  - Machines
- 
- Recommended Reading: **The Codebreakers** by David Kahn and **The Code Book** by Simon Singh.

# History: Caesar Cipher (Shift Cipher)

- Plaintext letters are replaced with letters a fixed shift away in the alphabet.



- Example:

– Plaintext: **The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog**

– Key: Shift 3

**ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ**

**DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC**

– Ciphertext: **WKHTX LFNEU RZQIR AMXPS VRYHU WKHOD CBGRJ**

# History: Caesar Cipher (Shift Cipher)

- ROT13: shift 13 (encryption and decryption: same operation)
- What is the key space?
  - 26 possible shifts.
- How to attack shift ciphers?
  - Brute force.



# History: Substitution Cipher


- Superset of shift ciphers: each letter is substituted for another one.
- Add a secret key
- Example:
  - Plaintext: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
  - Cipher: ZEBRAS CDEFGHIJKLMNOPQTUVWXY
- “State of the art” for thousands of years

# History: Substitution Cipher

- What is the key space?  $26! \approx 2^{88}$

- How to attack?

– Frequency analysis.



## Bigrams:

th 1.52%	en 0.55%	ng 0.18%
he 1.28%	ed 0.53%	of 0.16%
in 0.94%	to 0.52%	al 0.09%
er 0.94%	it 0.50%	de 0.09%
an 0.82%	ou 0.50%	se 0.08%
re 0.68%	ea 0.47%	le 0.08%
nd 0.63%	hi 0.46%	sa 0.06%
at 0.59%	is 0.46%	si 0.05%
on 0.57%	or 0.43%	ar 0.04%
nt 0.56%	ti 0.34%	ve 0.04%
ha 0.56%	as 0.33%	ra 0.04%
es 0.56%	te 0.27%	ld 0.02%
st 0.55%	et 0.19%	ur 0.02%


## Trigrams:

1. the	6. ion	11. nce
2. and	7. tio	12. edt
3. tha	8. for	13. tis
4. ent	9. nde	14. oft
5. ing	10. has	15. sth



# History: Enigma Machine

Uses rotors (substitution cipher) that change position after each key.



Key = initial setting of rotors

Key space?

$26^n$  for  $n$  rotors

# Kerckhoff's Principle

- Security of a cryptographic object should depend only on the secrecy of the secret (private) key.
- Security should not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm itself (“security by obscurity”).

# How Cryptosystems Work Today

- Public algorithms (Kerckhoff's Principle)
- Security proofs based on assumptions (not this course)
- Don't roll your own!


# How Cryptosystems Work Today

- Layered approach:
  - Cryptographic primitives, like block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions, and one-way trapdoor permutations
  - Cryptographic protocols, like CBC mode encryption, CTR mode encryption, HMAC message authentication

# Flavors of Cryptography

- Symmetric cryptography
  - Both communicating parties have access to a shared random string  $K$ , called the key.
- Asymmetric cryptography
  - Each party creates a public key  $pk$  and a secret key  $sk$ .


# Confidentiality: Basic Problem



Goal: send a message confidentially.

Given: both parties already know the same **secret**.


# One-Time Pad



= 10111101...




= 00110010...



00110010... =



# One-Time Pad



Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are **as many possible keys as possible plaintexts**, and **every key is equally likely** (Claude Shannon, 1949)





# Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
  - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
  - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as theoretically possible
  - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
  - ... as long as the key sequence is truly random
    - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
  - ... as long as each key is same length as plaintext
    - But how does sender communicate the key to receiver?

# Problems with One-Time Pad

- Key must be as long as the plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts
- Does not guarantee integrity
  - One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality
  - Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else


# Dangers of Reuse



Learn relationship between plaintexts

$$C_1 \oplus C_2 = (P_1 \oplus K) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K) = \\ (P_1 \oplus P_2) \oplus (K \oplus K) = P_1 \oplus P_2$$

# No Integrity



# Reducing Key Size

- What to do when it is infeasible to pre-share huge random keys?
  - When one-time pad is unrealistic...
- Use special cryptographic primitives:  
**block ciphers, stream ciphers**
  - Single key can be re-used (with some restrictions)
  - Use them in ways that provide integrity

# Stream Ciphers

- One-time pad:

Ciphertext(Key, Message) = Message  $\oplus$  Key

– Key must be a random bit sequence as long as message

- Idea: replace “random” with “pseudo-random”

# Stream Ciphers

- One-time pad:

Ciphertext(Key,Message)=Message  $\oplus$  Key

- Stream cipher:

Ciphertext(Key,Message)=  
Message  $\oplus$  PRNG(Key)

# Stream Ciphers


- One time pad, replace “random” with “pseudo-random”
  - Use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
  - PRNG takes a short, truly random secret seed and expands it into a long “random-looking” sequence
    - E.g., 128-bit seed into a  $10^6$ -bit pseudo-random sequence

No efficient algorithm can tell this sequence from truly random




# Block Ciphers

- Operates on a single chunk (“block”) of plaintext
  - For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES
  - Each key defines a different permutation
  - Same key is reused for each block (can use short keys)



# Permutations




- For N-bit input,  $2^N!$  possible permutations
- Idea for how to use a **keyed** permutation: split plaintext into blocks; for each block use **secret key** to pick a permutation
  - Without the key, permutation should “look random”

# Block Cipher Security

- Result should look like a random permutation on the inputs
  - Recall: not just shuffling bits. N-bit block cipher permutes over  $2^N$  inputs.
- Only computational guarantee of secrecy
  - Not impossible to break, just very expensive
    - If there is no efficient algorithm (unproven assumption!), then can only break by brute-force, try-every-possible-key search
  - Time and cost of breaking the cipher exceed the value and/or useful lifetime of protected information

# Block Cipher Operation (Simplified)



# Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity

# DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short
- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
  - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES  $\rightarrow$  3DES
  - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

# DES and 56 bit keys

- 56 bit keys are quite short

Key Size (bits)	Number of Alternative Keys	Time required at 1 encryption/ $\mu$ s	Time required at $10^6$ encryptions/ $\mu$ s
32	$2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9$	$2^{31} \mu$ s = 35.8 minutes	2.15 milliseconds
56	$2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$	$2^{55} \mu$ s = 1142 years	10.01 hours
128	$2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38}$	$2^{127} \mu$ s = $5.4 \times 10^{24}$ years	$5.4 \times 10^{18}$ years
168	$2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50}$	$2^{167} \mu$ s = $5.9 \times 10^{36}$ years	$5.9 \times 10^{30}$ years
26 characters (permutation)	$26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$	$2 \times 10^{26} \mu$ s = $6.4 \times 10^{12}$ years	$6.4 \times 10^6$ years

- 1999: EFF DES Crack + distributed machines
  - < 24 hours to find DES key
- DES  $\rightarrow$  3DES
  - 3DES: DES + inverse DES + DES (with 2 or 3 diff keys)

# Standard Block Ciphers

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - Feistel structure: builds invertible function using non-invertible ones
  - Invented by IBM, issued as federal standard in 1977
  - 64-bit blocks, 56-bit key + 8 bits for parity
- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard**
  - New federal standard as of 2001
    - NIST: National Institute of Standards & Technology
  - Based on the Rijndael algorithm
    - Selected via an open process
  - 128-bit blocks, keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits




# Block Ciphers Work on Fixed Length Blocks of Message

- How do you encrypt a short message?


# Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size





- What should we do?

# Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode




- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

# Information Leakage in ECB Mode




Encrypt in ECB mode




[Wikipedia]

# Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption




- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
  - Still does not guarantee integrity

# CBC Mode: Decryption




# ECB vs. CBC



[Picture due to Bart Preneel]

# CBC and Electronic Voting




Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:

```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,  
totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```




# Counter Mode (CTR): Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Still does not guarantee integrity; Fragile if ctr repeats

# Counter Mode (CTR): Decryption




# When is an Encryption Scheme “Secure”?

- Hard to recover the key?
  - What if attacker can learn plaintext without learning the key?
- Hard to recover plaintext from ciphertext?
  - What if attacker learns some bits or some function of bits?
- Fixed mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts?
  - What if attacker sees two identical ciphertexts and infers that the corresponding plaintexts are identical?
  - Implication: encryption must be randomized or stateful

# How Can a Cipher Be Attacked?

- Attackers knows ciphertext and encryption algorithm
  - **What else does the attacker know?** Depends on the application in which the cipher is used!
- **Ciphertext-only attack**
- **KPA: Known-plaintext attack** (stronger)
  - Knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
- **CPA: Chosen-plaintext attack** (even stronger)
  - Can obtain ciphertext for any plaintext of his choice
- **CCA: Chosen-ciphertext attack** (very strong)
  - Can decrypt any ciphertext except the target

# Chosen Plaintext Attack



... repeat for any PIN value

# Very Informal Intuition

Minimum security requirement for a modern encryption scheme

- Security against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
  - Ciphertext leaks no information about the plaintext
  - Even if the attacker correctly guesses the plaintext, he cannot verify his guess
  - Every ciphertext is unique, encrypting same message twice produces completely different ciphertexts
- Security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA)
  - Integrity protection – it is not possible to change the plaintext by modifying the ciphertext

# Why Hide Everything?

- Leaking even a little bit of information about the plaintext can be disastrous
- Electronic voting
  - 2 candidates on the ballot (1 bit to encode the vote)
  - If ciphertext leaks the parity bit of the encrypted plaintext, eavesdropper learns the entire vote
- Also, want a strong definition, that implies other definitions (like not being able to obtain key)