

**CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and
Privacy**

SSL/TLS

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We have all the pieces!

- Symmetric Encryption (privacy!)
- MACs (integrity!)
- Asymmetric Crypto (bootstrapping!)
- Certificate Authorities (authenticity!)

SSL/TLS

 <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox>


- Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security
 - Same protocol, new version (TLS is current)
- De facto standard for Internet security
 - “The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications”
- Deployed in every Web browser; also VoIP, payment systems, distributed systems, etc.

SSL/TLS

- TLS is typically used on top of a TCP connection

TLS


- Can be used over other transport protocols




TLS Basics

- TLS consists of **two** protocols
 - Familiar pattern for key exchange protocols
- Handshake protocol
 - Use **public-key cryptography** to establish a shared secret key between the client and the server
- Record protocol
 - Use the **secret symmetric key** established in the handshake protocol to protect communication between the client and the server


Basic Handshake Protocol




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
Basic Handshake Protocol




Basic Handshake Protocol




Basic Handshake Protocol



“Core” SSL 3.0 Handshake (Not TLS)




Version Rollback Attack



“Chosen-Protocol” Attacks


- Why do people release new versions of security protocols?
Because the old version got broken!
- New version must be **backward-compatible**
 - Not everybody upgrades right away
- Attacker can fool someone into using the old, broken version and exploit known vulnerability
 - Similar: fool victim into using weak crypto algorithms
- Defense is hard: must authenticate version in early designs
- Many protocols have had “version rollback” attacks
 - SSL, SSH, GSM (cell phones)

Version Check in SSL 3.0




Web Security!

Big Picture: Browser and Network



The browser renders or executes arbitrary HTML, CSS, and Javascript send by hosts on the Internet.

Where Does the Attacker Live?




All of These Should Be Safe

- Safe to visit an evil website



- Safe to visit two pages at the same time



- Safe delegation



Building Blocks of the Web (and Web Security)

- HTTP(S)
- Cookies

HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

- Application layer protocol used by browsers and web servers
- **Stateless** request/response protocol
 - Each request is independent of previous requests
 - Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications

HTTP Request

Method

File

HTTP version


Headers

```
GET /default.asp HTTP/1.0
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95)
Connection: Keep-Alive
If-Modified-Since: Sunday, 17-Apr-96 04:32:58 GMT
```

Blank line

Data – none for GET

HTTP Response



HTTP Verbs

- HTTP declares a number of “verbs” that clients can use to request or provide information
 - **GET** asks for a resource
 - **POST** sends information
 - **HEAD** gets metadata (headers) for a resource
 - Also: PUT, DELETE, TRACE, OPTIONS, CONNECT, PATCH

HTTP Resources

- URL stands for **Uniform Resource Locator**
- Specifies the location of a resource on a network – what server is it on, where is it on that server?
- Resources could include HTML pages, images, data, etc.

HTTP Verbs

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HTTP Verbs



- HTTP declares a number of “verbs” that clients can use to request or provide information
 - **GET** asks for a resource (Give me this image)
 - **POST** sends information (I want to log in)
 - **HEAD** gets metadata (headers) for a resource
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HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

- Application layer protocol used by browsers and web servers
- **Stateless request/response protocol**
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Cookies – Statefulness for HTTP

A **cookie** is a file created by a website to store information in the browser




HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state

Cookie Format

- Cookies are just KEY=VALUE pairs, e.g.,
 - language=ENGLISH
 - userID=Alice
 - sessionID=
8113d906-62e8-49e1-80e1-65805cb51cab
 - adID=
9c740c60-8d88-4da6-bb83-041e95c1efac

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HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state

What Are Cookie Used For?

- Personalization
 - Website remembers visitor preferences
 - language=ENGLISH
- Authentication
 - The cookie “proves” client is logged in
 - sessionID=8113d906-62e8...
- Tracking
 - Follow the user from site to site;
 - adID=9c740c60-8d88...

Goals of Web Security


- Safely browse the Web
 - A malicious website cannot steal information from or modify legitimate sites or otherwise harm the user...
 - ... even if visited concurrently with a legitimate site -- in a separate browser window, tab, or even iframe on the same webpage
- Support secure Web applications
 - Applications delivered over the Web should have the same security properties we require for standalone applications

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


Two Sides of Web Security

- Web browser
 - Responsible for securely confining Web content presented by visited websites
- Web applications
 - Online merchants, banks, blogs, Google Apps ...
 - Mix of server-side and client-side code
 - Server-side code written in PHP, Ruby, ASP, JSP... runs on the Web server
 - Client-side code written in JavaScript... runs in the Web browser
 - Many potential bugs: XSS, XSRF, SQL injection

Where Does the Attacker Live?


Attacker can make malicious requests to web servers – can even use HTML/JS to make those requests From users' browsers!



Attacker gets to run Javascript and HTML code in the browser

Attacker may control 1 or more domains or websites

Web Attacker



- Controls a malicious website (attacker.com)
 - Can obtain an TLS certificate for attacker.com
- User visits attacker.com – why?
 - Phishing email, enticing content, search results, placed by an ad network, blind luck ...
 - Or, attacker.com is embedded on another page
 - loading the friendly page loads content from attacker.com

Web Attacker



www.attacker.com

Javascript, or, Software Security for the Web!



Browser receives content,
displays HTML and executes scripts

```
<html>
```

```
...
```

```
<p> The script on this page is totally trustworthy
```

```
<script>
```

```
    doSomethingEvil ()
```

```
</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</html>
```

www.attacker.com

A potentially malicious webpage gets to
execute some code on user's machine!

Browser Sandbox



- Goal: safely execute JavaScript provided by a website
 - No/limited access to OS/network/filesystem/browser data.
 - No buffer overflows, no way to execute arbitrary native code, process isolation between tabs
 - Attacker shouldn't be able to access data from other tabs or browser windows
 - attacker.com shouldn't be able to access data from bank.com, even if you're logged in


A Strawperson Attack




www.attacker.com (the parent)
cannot access HTML elements in
the iframe
(and vice versa).

Same-Origin Policy: DOM

Only code from same origin can **access HTML elements** on another site (or in an iframe).



www.example.com (the parent) **can** access HTML elements in the iframe (and vice versa).



www.evil.com (the parent) **cannot** access HTML elements in the iframe (and vice versa).

Same-Origin Policy

Website origin = (scheme, domain, port)

Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.example.com/dir/page.html	Success	Same protocol and host
http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol and host
http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html	Failure	Same protocol and host but different port
https://www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different protocol
http://en.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host
http://example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http://v2.www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)

[Example thanks to Wikipedia.]