

CSE 484 (Winter 2008)

## Computer Security and Privacy

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### What is Computer Security?

- ◆ Systems may fail for many reasons
- ◆ Reliability deals with accidental failures
- ◆ Usability deals with problems arising from operating mistakes made by users
- ◆ Security deals with intentional failures created by intelligent parties
  - Security is about computing in the presence of an adversary
  - But security, reliability, and usability are all related

### Two key themes of this course

- ◆ How to **think** about security
  - The Security Mindset - "new" way to think about systems
  - Threat models, security goals, assets, risks, adversaries
  - Connection between security, technology, politics, ethics, ...
  - This is the most important part of the course
    - Technology changes
    - But the mindset is something you can keep forever
- ◆ **Technical aspects** of security
  - Attack techniques
  - Defenses

### Technical Themes

- ◆ Vulnerabilities of computer systems
  - Software problems (buffer overflows); crypto problems; network problems (DoS, worms); people problems (usability, phishing)
- ◆ Defensive technologies
  - Cryptography
  - Authentication
  - "Defense in depth"
  - Software security (like static analysis)

## What This Course is Not About

- ◆ Not a comprehensive course on computer security
  - Computer security is a broad discipline!
  - Impossible to cover everything in one quarter
    - Not much language-based security
    - Moderate discussion of crypto (crypto could take a whole year of courses!)
  - So be careful in industry or wherever you go!
- ◆ Not about all of the latest and greatest attacks
  - Read bugtraq or other online sources instead
- ◆ Not a course on ethical, legal or economic issues
  - We will touch on ethical issues, but not focus on them
- ◆ Not a course on how to “hack” or “crack” systems

## What Drives the Attackers?

- ◆ Adversarial motivations:
  - Money, fame, malice, curiosity, politics....
- ◆ Fake websites, identity theft, steal money and more
- ◆ Control victim's machine, send spam, capture passwords
- ◆ Industrial espionage and international politics
- ◆ Access copy-protected movies and videos
- ◆ Attack on website, extort money
- ◆ Wreak havoc, achieve fame and glory

## Challenges: What is “Security?”

- ◆ What does security mean?
  - Often the hardest part of building a secure system is figuring out what security means
  - What are the assets to protect?
  - What are the threats to those assets?
  - Who are the adversaries, and what are their resources?
  - What is the security policy?
- ◆ Perfect security does not exist!
  - Security is not a binary property
  - Security is about risk management

## From Policy to Implementation

- ◆ After you've figured out what security means to your application, there are still challenges
  - How is the security policy enforced?
  - Design bugs
    - Poor use of cryptography
    - Poor sources of randomness
    - ...
  - Implementation bugs
    - Buffer overflow attacks
    - ...
  - Is the system usable?

Don't forget the users! They are a critical component!

## Many Participants

- ◆ Many parties involved
  - System developers
  - Companies deploying the system
  - The end users
  - The adversaries (possibly one of the above)
- ◆ Different parties have different goals
  - System developers and companies may wish to optimize cost
  - End users may desire security, privacy, and usability
  - But the relationship between these goals is quite complex (will customers choose not to buy the product if it is not secure?)

## Approaches to Security

- ◆ Prevention
  - Stop an attack
- ◆ Detection
  - Detect an ongoing or past attack
- ◆ Response
  - Respond to attacks
- ◆ The threat of a response may be enough to deter some attackers

## Whole-System is Critical

- ◆ Securing a system involves a whole-system view
  - Cryptography
  - Implementation
  - People
  - Physical security
  - Everything in between
- ◆ This is because "security is only as strong as the weakest link," and security can fail in many places
  - No reason to attack the strongest part of a system if you can walk right around it.

## Analyzing the Security of a System

- ◆ First thing: Summarize the system as clearly and concisely as possible
  - **Critical step.** If you can't summarize the system clearly and concisely, how can you analyze it's security?
- ◆ Next steps:
  - Identify the assets: What do you wish to protect?
  - Identify the adversaries and threats
  - Identify vulnerabilities: Weaknesses in the system
  - Calculate the risks
  - Evaluate controls / mitigation strategies, and iterate

## Many Desirable Security Properties

- ◆ Authenticity
- ◆ Confidentiality
- ◆ Integrity
- ◆ Availability
- ◆ Accountability and non-repudiation
- ◆ Freshness
- ◆ Access control
- ◆ Privacy of collected information
- ◆ ...

## Software Security

- ◆ Issues:
  - Input validation, Buffer overflows, Integer overflows, Implicit casting, XSS
  - TOCTOU
  - Poor randomness
  - Timing attacks
- ◆ Defenses:
  - Within the language (e.g., strong types)
  - Within the system/compiler (e.g., Canaries)
  - External to the language and system (e.g., static or dynamic analysis, fuzz testing)
  - General principles (e.g., small TCB, securely delete memory, least privilege)

## Cryptography

- ◆ Understand different models:
  - Symmetric vs asymmetric
  - PKI
- ◆ Basic components, and examples of them:
  - Hash function (SHA-1, SHA-256, ...)
  - Block cipher (AES, DES, 3DES, ...)
  - MAC (HMAC-SHA1, ...)
  - Symmetric encryption scheme (AES in CBC or CTR mode, ...)
  - Digital signatures (e.g., RSA, DSA)
  - Asymmetric encryption scheme (e.g., RSA)
  - Key agreement (Diffie-Hellman key exchange)

## Cryptography

- ◆ Don't need to know internals of individual components.
- ◆ But definitely need to know
  - Which object to use to solve which problem
  - What bad things might happen if you use the wrong tool for the job; (e.g., why do you not want to use AES in CTR mode encryption to provide integrity?)

## Authentication

- ◆ Different approaches
  - What you know
  - Who you are
  - What you have with you
- ◆ Passwords
  - Challenges to use (memorability, strength, usability, ...)
  - How server should verify password (should the server store a copy of the password, a hashed copy, ...?)
  - Types of attackers to consider (related to the above bullet)
- ◆ Biometrics
  - Advantages
  - Disadvantages

## Usability

- ◆ Intimate relationship between security mechanisms and usability
  - Incentives for using system?
  - Will users be able to understand how to use the system?
  - Will new security issues arise if a security system is deployed (e.g., with password managers, some usage scenarios make users less secure)
  -

## Network Security

- ◆ Problems arise in
  - Routing issues
  - DNS issues
  - Path issues
  - Bugs
- ◆ Classes of attacks
  - Denial of Service
  - Impersonation
  - Eavesdropping or content modification
- ◆ Key points:
  - Failures at interaction between layers
  - Asymmetry between attacker and defender
  - Some attacks designers never considered
  - All motivations for existing security decisions (SSL/TLS, filter certain types of packets, check inputs, etc).

## Big picture again

- ◆ Defense in Depth
- ◆ Cost vs benefits (recall risk analyses)
- ◆ Example: Firewalls
  - Stateless packet filters
  - Stateful, application-aware firewalls
  - Application proxies

## Web security

### ◆ Key issues

- Browser is the new OS
- State on client
- Integrity (e.g., input validation, for pricing)
- Privacy (e.g., cookies, tracking)
- Website isolation (e.g., cross-site scripting)