






Alice (k)



Bob (k)




if $T'' == T'$
then return valid
else
return invalid



CBC MAC NOT SECURE
AGAINST VARIABLE-LENGTH
MESSAGES


$(M_0 || M_1, T)$ \longrightarrow

adversary





Bob

$(M_0 || M_1 || M_0 \oplus T || M_1, T')$



$(M_0 || M_1 || M_0 \oplus T || M_1, T')$

CBC-MAC variant that appends
block length to end of message



Chosen message-tag pairs
that Alice MACs
a forgery.

Alice

$C_A \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$R_A \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{128}$

$C = 0$ Alice pays
else Bob pays

Bob.

$C_B \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$R_B \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{128}$

Alice

$$C_A = 90, 15$$
$$R_A \leftarrow 90, 15 \quad 128$$

$$H_A = h(R_A || C_A) \text{ Alice}$$


$C = 0$ Alice pays else Bob pays

Bob

$$C_B = 90, 15$$
$$R_B \leftarrow 90, 15$$

$$H_B = h(R_B || C) \text{ Bob}$$

one-wayness




no salt

$$x = h(C)$$
$$y = h(C)$$

$H_A = H_B$ @ random is very hard

reveal



collision resistance

$$H'_B = h(R_B || C_B) \text{ Bob}$$

if $H_B \neq H'_B$ halts

$$C = C_A \oplus C_B$$

$$H'_A = h(R_A || C_A) \text{ Alice}$$


if $H_A \neq H'_A$ halts

$$C = C_A \oplus C_B$$

$$h(R_B || 0 || \text{Bob}) = h(R_B || 1 || \text{Bob}) = H_B$$

random coin $C = C_A \oplus C_B$

HMAC





If this is the MAC.

Ask Alice to MAC message M of my choosing \Rightarrow Disresult.

Now I can forge

(M', T')

~~(M', T')~~



MAC