## Lecture 4

## Duality

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### 4.1 Weak duality

Given a linear program, write all the equalities with a greater than or equal sign. The constraints can be strict, and you can have two types of variables to distinguish. The last equation is not really a constraint.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Min} \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} & \\
\forall j=1 \ldots k_{1} & \sum_{i} a_{i j} x_{i} \geq b_{j} \\
\forall j=k_{1}+1 \ldots m & \sum_{i} a_{i j} x_{i}=b_{j} \\
\forall i=1 \ldots k_{2} & x_{i} \geq 0 \\
\forall i=k_{2}+1 \ldots n & x_{i}<>0 \mid 0
\end{aligned}
$$

For the dual, first create dual variables for each constraint, as though multiplying by some coefficient. Don't create dual variables for the positive constraints. Min becomes max, constraints become variables, variables become constraints, nonnegatives become inequalities, and unconstrained variables become equalities:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Max} \sum_{j=1}^{m} b_{j} y_{j} & \\
\forall j=1 \ldots k_{1} & y_{j} \geq 0 \\
\forall j=k_{1}+1 \ldots m & y_{j}<>0 \\
\forall i=1 \ldots k_{2} & \sum_{j} a_{i j} y_{j} \leq c_{i} \\
\forall i=k_{2}+1 \ldots n & \sum_{j} a_{i j} y_{j}=c_{i}
\end{aligned}
$$

Theorem 4.1. Weak Duality Take any feasible primal solution $X$ and take any feasible dual solution $Y$.

Then the objective function of the primal is greater than or equal to the objective function of the dual:

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} \geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} b_{j} y_{j}
$$

Proof. Proof uses constraints of primal and dual.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} & =\sum_{i=1}^{k_{2}} c_{i} x_{i}+\sum_{i=k_{2}+1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} \\
& =\sum_{i=1}^{k_{2}} c_{i} x_{i}+\sum_{i=k_{2}+1}^{n}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j}\right) x_{i}
\end{aligned}
$$

[the $x_{i}$ 's are nonnegative, so if the $c_{i}$ 's decrease, the sum will decrease]

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \geq \sum_{i=1}^{k_{2}}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j}\right) x_{i}+\sum_{i=k_{2}+1}^{n}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j}\right) x_{i} \\
& =\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j} x_{i} \\
& =\sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i j} x_{i} y_{j} \\
& \geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} b_{j} y_{j}
\end{aligned}
$$

### 4.2 Strong Duality

Theorem 4.2. Strong Duality Optimum objective functions are equal.
Proof. We will prove: if the objective function is optimum, then the dual is greater than or equal to the primal. With weak duality, this gives us equality.

Write the primal constraints as

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\forall j=1 \ldots k_{1} & \sum_{i} a_{i j} x_{i} \geq b_{j} \\
\forall j=k_{1}+1 \ldots m & \sum_{i} a_{i j} x_{i} \geq b_{j} \\
\forall j=k_{1}+1 \ldots m & \sum_{i}\left(-a_{i j}\right) x_{i} \geq-b_{j} \\
\forall i=1 \ldots k_{2} & x_{i} \geq 0 \tag{4.4}
\end{array}
$$

Equations (2) and (3) are equivalent to the original strict equality constraint. Call the variable associated with (1) $y_{j} \geq 0$; with (2), $z_{j} \geq 0$; with (3), $w_{j} \geq 0$; and with (4), $v_{i} \geq 0$. Assume that min $\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i}=d$ is optimum. Then the primal constraints must imply $\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} \geq d$.

By Farka's lemma, there must be a proof of this fact. On the left hand side, we should get something by summing that is $\geq d$. This will prove our theorem.

$$
c_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{k_{1}} a_{i j} y_{j}+\sum_{j=k_{1}+1}^{m} a_{i j} z_{j}+\sum_{j=k_{1}+1}^{m}\left(-a_{i j}\right) w_{j}+v_{i}\left(i=1 \ldots k_{2}\right)
$$

Right hand side:

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{k_{1}} b_{j} y_{j}+\sum_{j=k_{1}+1}^{m} b_{j} z_{j}+\sum_{j=k_{1}+1}^{m}\left(-b_{j}\right) w_{j} \geq d
$$

We can ignore the $v_{i}$ 's by making it $\geq$, and tighten up the equation:

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{k_{1}} b_{j} y_{j}+\sum_{j=k_{1}+1}^{m} b_{j}\left(z_{j}-w_{j}\right) \geq d
$$

So there exists a solution that is feasible for the dual and is greater than or equal to the primal. However, this proof assumes the existence of feasible solutions; without them, the solution is unbounded. The equations can't both be infeasible. If one is infeasible, Farka's gives you a feasible solution in the dual.

### 4.3 Complementary Slackness

## Definition 4.1. Primal Complementary Slackness

$$
\forall i=1 \ldots k_{2} c_{i} x_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j} x_{i}
$$

Either $x_{i}=0$ or $x_{i}>0$ and $c_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{m}$ aijy $y_{j}$.

## Definition 4.2. Dual Complementary Slackness

$$
\forall i=j \ldots k_{1} b_{j} y_{j}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i j} x_{i} y_{j}
$$

Either $y_{j}=0$ or $y_{j}>0$ and $b_{j}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} a i j x_{i}$.
If the objective functions are equal then the complementary slackness conditions hold; if both complementary slackness conditions hold, then the objective functions are equal.

### 4.3.1 Integer Program

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \quad \operatorname{Min} \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{i} x_{i} \\
& \forall j=1 \ldots m \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i j} x_{i} \geq b_{j} \\
& \quad x_{i} \in\{0,1\} \\
& \text { All } c_{i}, b_{j}, a_{i j} \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

Relaxation: $x_{i} \geq 0$
Dual:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{Max} \sum_{j=1}^{m} b_{j} y_{j} \\
& \forall i=1 \ldots n \quad \sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{i j} y_{j} \leq c_{i} \\
& \quad y_{j} \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

We are not interested in the typical optimum solution. Instead, we try to get an integral solution for the primal and some nice solution for the dual that we can prove is close to optimum.

Any arbitrary integral solution $\geq \mathrm{OPT}_{I} \geq \mathrm{OPT}_{L P}=\mathrm{OPT}_{\text {Dual }} \geq$ Value $_{\text {Feasibledual }}$
Take any feasible integral solution. It is greater than or equal to any feasible dual. The feasible integral solution that we find with the LP is less than or equal to some factor times the feasible dual that the algorithm finds.

Either $x_{i}=0$ or $x_{i}>0$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i j} y_{j} \geq c_{i}$. This is sufficient for complementary slackness. This may not happen, so ideally at least

$$
\alpha\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i j} y_{j}\right) \geq c_{i} \text { for some } \alpha \geq 1
$$

This is called $\alpha$-approximate primal complementary slackness. Similarly, $\beta$-approximate dual complementary slackness conditions are: either $y_{j}=0$ or $y_{j}>0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i j} x_{i} \leq \beta b_{j}$. Primal feasibility already implies $\sum a_{i j} x_{i} \geq b_{j}$, so $\beta \geq 1$.
$\alpha-\beta$ factor algorithm: primal complementary slackness satisfied by $\alpha$, dual complementary slackness satisfied by $\beta$.

Intuitively, $x_{i}$ 's are resources. $y_{j}$ 's are money you pay. If some resource is bought then you almost pay correctly in dual solution. Constraints are people and they are independent. Everyone wants to satisfy his or her constraint. $y_{j}$ is the amount of money that the $j$ th person is willing to spend, but he doesn't want to overpay. If the price of the resource is $c_{i}$, no one wants to overpay for that resource. Complementary slackness is saying no resource is underpaid, either.

### 4.3.2 Vertex cover example

Given an undirected graph G, each node $v$ has weight function $w_{v} \geq 0$. The objective is to pick vertices $v_{1}, \ldots v_{k}$ such that the total weight is as small as possible and all edges are covered by at least one vertex: $\forall e=v_{i}, v_{j}$, either $v_{i}$ is picked or $v_{j}$ is picked, or both. We claim there is an algorithm with factor 2 .

LP: Let $x_{v}$ be 1 if it's picked and 0 otherwise.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Min} \sum_{v} w_{v} x_{v} & \\
\forall e=u, v & x_{u}+x_{v} \geq 1 \\
x_{v} \in\{0,1\} & \text { relax to } x_{v} \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

Dual:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Max} \sum_{e \in \delta(u)} y_{e} & \\
\forall u & \sum_{e \in \delta(u)} y_{e} \leq w_{u} \\
\forall v & \sum_{e \in \delta(u)} y_{e} \leq w_{v}
\end{aligned}
$$

Take any maximal dual: if you try to increase any $y_{e}$, you'll get an infeasible solution. Take any maximal $y_{e}$ and pick corresponding vertex. This is feasible, because if you look at any edge, it must have been picked on at least one side. $y_{e}$ is in two inequalities, and once has no slack (since solution is maximal), so one is picked. The factor 2 comes because $\beta=2$. There is no slack in the primal, the $b_{j}$ s are 1 . But you may have picked two vertices.

Intuitively: every edge is offering $y_{e}$ money to get chosen. A vertex that gets enough money will sell; it may sell to two $y_{e}$ 's and that's the factor of 2 .

