# CSEP 521 <br> Applied Algorithms 

Richard Anderson Winter 2013
Lecture 1

## CSEP 521 Course Introduction

- CSEP 521, Applied Algorithms
- Monday's, 6:30-9:20 pm
- CSE 305 and Microsoft Building 99
- Instructor
- Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
- Office hours:
- CSE 582
- Monday, 4:00-5:00 pm or by appointment
- Teaching Assistant
- Tanvir Aumi, tanvir@cs.washington.edu
- Office hours:
- TBD


## Announcements

- It's on the web.
- Homework due at start of class on Mondays
- HW 1, Due January 14, 2013
- It's on the web
http://www.cs.washington.edu/education/courses/csep521/13wi/


## Text book

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
- Read Chapters 1 \& 2

- Expected coverage:
- Chapter 1 through 7



## Recorded lectures

- This is a distance course, so lectures are recorded and will be available on line for later viewing
- However, low attendance in the distance PMP course is a concern
- Various draconian measures are under discussion
- We will make lectures available
- Please attend class, and participate
- Participation may be a component of the class grade


## Lecture schedule

- Monday holidays:
- Monday, January 21, MLK
- Monday, February 18, President's day
- Make up lectures will be scheduled, which will be recorded for offline viewing
- Hopefully, some students will attend, so there is a studio audience
- First makeup lecture:
- Thursday, January 17, 5:00-6:30 pm
- Additional makeup lectures to accommodate RJA's travel schedule


## Course Mechanics

- Homework
- Due Mondays
- Textbook problems and programming exercises
- Choice of language
- Expectation that Algorithmic Code is original
- Target: 1 week turnaround on grading
- Late Policy: Two assignments may be turned in up to one week late
- Exams (In class, tentative)
- Midterm, Monday, Feb 11 (60 minutes)
- Final, Monday, March 18, 6:30-8:20 pm
- Approximate grade weighting
- HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35

All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

## How to study algorithms

- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
- Where algorithms apply
- What makes an algorithm work
- Algorithmic thinking


## Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
- Assign TAs to Instructors
- Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
- E.g., Prof A. would rather have student $X$ than her current TA, and student $X$ would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.


## Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



## Example (1 of 3)

## $\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$ <br> $m_{2}: w_{2} w_{1}$ <br> $w_{1}: m_{1} m_{2}$ <br> $\mathrm{w}_{2}: \mathrm{m}_{2} \mathrm{~m}_{1}$

○W
$\mathrm{m}_{2} \bigcirc$
$\mathrm{W}_{2}$

## Example (2 of 3)

$\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$
$\mathrm{m}_{2}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$
$w_{1}: m_{1} m_{2}$
$w_{2}: m_{1} m_{2}$

## $\mathrm{m}_{1} \bigcirc$

OW
$\mathrm{m}_{2} \bigcirc$
$W_{2}$

## Example (3 of 3)

$\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2}$
$\mathrm{m}_{2}: \mathrm{w}_{2} \mathrm{w}_{1}$
$w_{1}: m_{2} m_{1}$
$w_{2}: m_{1} m_{2}$

OW
$\mathrm{m}_{2} \bigcirc$
$W_{2}$

## Formal Problem

- Input
- Preference lists for $m_{1}, m_{2}, \ldots, m_{n}$
- Preference lists for $\mathrm{w}_{1}, \mathrm{w}_{2}, \ldots, \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{n}}$
- Output
- Perfect matching M satisfying stability property:
If $\left(m^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\right) \in M$ and $\left(m^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime \prime}\right) \in M$ then
( $m$ ' prefers $w^{\prime}$ to $w^{\prime \prime}$ ) or ( $w^{\prime \prime}$ prefers $m^{\prime \prime}$ to $m^{\prime}$ )


## Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w
If $w$ is unmatched, $w$ accepts
If $w$ is matched to $m_{2}$
If $w$ prefers $m$ to $m_{2} w$ accepts $m$, dumping $m_{2}$
If $w$ prefers $m_{2}$ to $m, w$ rejects $m$

Unmatched $m$ proposes to the highest $w$ on its preference list that it has not already proposed to

## Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free
While there is a free $m$
$w$ highest on m's list that $m$ has not proposed to if $w$ is free, then match ( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ ) else
suppose ( $\left.m_{2}, w\right)$ is matched
if $w$ prefers $m$ to $m_{2}$ unmatch $\left(m_{2}, w\right)$ match ( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ )

## Example

$\mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{2} \mathrm{w}_{3}$
$\mathrm{m}_{2}: \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{~W}_{3} \mathrm{~W}_{2}$
$m_{3}: w_{1} w_{2} W_{3}$
$\mathrm{m}_{2} \bigcirc$
$W_{2}$
$w_{1}: m_{2} m_{3} m_{1}$
$\mathrm{w}_{2}: \mathrm{m}_{3} \mathrm{~m}_{1} \mathrm{~m}_{2}$
$w_{3}: m_{3} m_{1} m_{2}$
$\bigcirc W_{1}$
$\mathrm{m}_{1} \bigcirc$
號

## Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
- m's proposals get worse (have higher m-rank)
- Once w is matched, w stays matched
- w's partners get better (have lower w-rank)


## Claim: The algorithm stops in at most $\mathrm{n}^{2}$ steps

# When the algorithms halts, every w 

 is matchedWhy?

Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

## The resulting matching is stable

Suppose
$\left(m_{1}, w_{1}\right) \in M,\left(m_{2}, w_{2}\right) \in M$ $\mathrm{m}_{1}$ prefers $\mathrm{w}_{2}$ to $\mathrm{w}_{1}$


How could this happen?

## Result

- Simple, $\mathrm{O}\left(\mathrm{n}^{2}\right)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
- A stable matching always exists


## A closer look

## Stable matchings are not necessarily fair

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
\mathrm{m}_{1}: & \mathrm{w}_{1} & \mathrm{w}_{2} & \mathrm{w}_{3} \\
\mathrm{~m}_{2}: & \mathrm{w}_{2} & \mathrm{w}_{3} & \mathrm{w}_{1} \\
\mathrm{~m}_{3}: & \mathrm{w}_{3} & \mathrm{w}_{1} & \mathrm{w}_{2} \\
& & & \\
& & & \\
\mathrm{w}_{1}: & \mathrm{m}_{2} & \mathrm{~m}_{3} & \mathrm{~m}_{1} \\
\mathrm{w}_{2}: & \mathrm{m}_{3} & \mathrm{~m}_{1} & \mathrm{~m}_{2} \\
\mathrm{w}_{3}: & \mathrm{m}_{1} & \mathrm{~m}_{2} & \mathrm{~m}_{3}
\end{array}
$$




How many stable matchings can you find?

## Algorithm under specified

- Many different ways of picking m's to propose
- Surprising result
- All orderings of picking free m's give the same result
- Proving this type of result
- Reordering argument
- Prove algorithm is computing something mores specific
- Show property of the solution - so it computes a specific stable matching


# Proposal Algorithm finds the best possible solution for M 

Formalize the notion of best possible solution:
( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ ) is valid if ( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ ) is in some stable matching
best( m ): the highest ranked $w$ for $m$ such that ( $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{w}$ ) is valid
$S^{*}=\{(\mathrm{m}$, best $(\mathrm{m})\}$
Every execution of the proposal algorithm computes $\mathrm{S}^{*}$

## Proof

See the text book - pages 9-12

Related result: Proposal algorithm is the worst case for W
Algorithm is the M-optimal algorithm
Proposal algorithms where w's propose is W-Optimal

## Best choices for one side may be bad for the other

Design a configuration for $m_{1}$ : problem of size 4:

M proposal algorithm:
All m's get first choice, all w's $m_{3}:$ get last choice
W proposal algorithm:
All w's get first choice, all m's get last choice

$$
w_{1}:
$$

$W_{2}$ :
$W_{3}$ :
$W_{4}$ :

## But there is a stable second choice

Design a configuration for $m_{1}$ : problem of size 4:

M proposal algorithm:
All m's get first choice, all w's get last choice
W proposal algorithm:
All w's get first choice, all m's get last choice
There is a stable matching where everyone gets their second choice

$$
m_{2}
$$

$m_{3}$ :
$\mathrm{m}_{4}$ :
$\mathrm{w}_{1}$ :
$W_{2}$ :
$W_{3}$ :
$W_{4}$ :

## Suppose there are n m's, and n w's

- What is the minimum possible M-rank?
- What is the maximum possible M-rank?
- Suppose each $m$ is matched with a random w , what is the expected M -rank?


## Random Preferences

Suppose that the preferences are completely random

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{m}_{1}: \mathrm{w}_{8} \mathrm{w}_{3} \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{5} \mathrm{w}_{9} \mathrm{w}_{2} \mathrm{w}_{4} \mathrm{w}_{6} \mathrm{w}_{7} \mathrm{w}_{10} \\
& \mathrm{~m}_{2}: \mathrm{w}_{7} \mathrm{w}_{10} \mathrm{w}_{1} \mathrm{w}_{9} \mathrm{w}_{3} \mathrm{w}_{4} \mathrm{w}_{8} \mathrm{w}_{2} \mathrm{w}_{5} \mathrm{w}_{6} \\
& \ldots \\
& \mathrm{w}_{1}: \mathrm{m}_{1} \mathrm{~m}_{4} \mathrm{~m}_{9} \mathrm{~m}_{5} \mathrm{~m}_{10} \mathrm{~m}_{3} \mathrm{~m}_{2} \mathrm{~m}_{6} \mathrm{~m}_{8} \mathrm{~m}_{7} \\
& \mathrm{w}_{2}: \mathrm{m}_{5} \mathrm{~m}_{8} \mathrm{~m}_{1} \mathrm{~m}_{3} \mathrm{~m}_{2} \mathrm{~m}_{7} \mathrm{~m}_{9} \mathrm{~m}_{10} \mathrm{~m}_{4} \mathrm{~m}_{6}
\end{aligned}
$$

If there are n m's and n w's, what is the expected value of the M-rank and the W-rank when the proposal algorithm computes a stable matching?

## What is the run time of the Stable Matching Algorithm?

Initially all m in M and w in W are free
While there is a free $m$
Executed at most $n^{2}$ times $w$ highest on m's list that $m$ has not proposed to if $w$ is free, then match ( $m, w$ ) else
suppose $\left(m_{2}, w\right)$ is matched
if $w$ prefers $m$ to $m_{2}$ unmatch $\left(m_{2}, w\right)$ match (m, w)

## $\mathrm{O}(1)$ time per iteration

- Find free m
- Find next available w
- If $w$ is matched, determine $m_{2}$
- Test if w prefers $m$ to $m_{2}$
- Update matching

What does it mean for an algorithm to be efficient?

## Key ideas

- Formalizing real world problem
- Model: graph and preference lists
- Mechanism: stability condition
- Specification of algorithm with a natural operation
- Proposal
- Establishing termination of process through invariants and progress measure
- Under specification of algorithm
- Establishing uniqueness of solution


## Five Problems

## Theory of Algorithms

- What is expertise?
- How do experts differ from novices?


## Introduction of five problems

- Show the types of problems we will be considering in the class
- Examples of important types of problems
- Similar looking problems with very different characteristics
- Problems
- Scheduling
- Weighted Scheduling
- Bipartite Matching
- Maximum Independent Set
- Competitive Facility Location


## What is a problem?

- Instance
- Solution
- Constraints on solution
- Measure of value


## Problem: Scheduling

- Suppose that you own a banquet hall
- You have a series of requests for use of the hall: $\left(s_{1}, f_{1}\right),\left(s_{2}, f_{2}\right), \ldots$

- Find a set of requests as large as possible with no overlap


## What is the largest solution?

## Greedy Algorithm

- Test elements one at a time if they can be members of the solution
- If an element is not ruled out by earlier choices, add it to the solution
- Many possible choices for ordering (length, start time, end time)
- For this problem, considering the jobs by increasing end time works


## Suppose we add values?

- $\left(\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$, start time, finish time, payment
- Maximize value of elements in the solution



## Greedy Algorithms

- Earliest finish time
- Maximum value
- Give counter examples to show these algorithms don't find the maximum value solution


## Dynamic Programming

- Requests $R_{1}, R_{2}, R_{3}, \ldots$
- Assume requests are in increasing order of finish time ( $\mathrm{f}_{1}<\mathrm{f}_{2}<\mathrm{f}_{3} \ldots$ )
- Opt is the maximum value solution of $\left\{R_{1}, R_{2}, \ldots, R_{i}\right\}$ containing $R_{i}$
- Opt $_{\mathrm{i}}=\operatorname{Max}\left\{\mathrm{j} \mid \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}<\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}\right\}\left[\mathrm{Opt}_{\mathrm{j}}+\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{i}}\right]$


## Matching

- Given a bipartite graph $G=(\mathrm{U}, \mathrm{V}, \mathrm{E})$, find a subset of the edges $M$ of maximum size with no common endpoints.
- Application:
- U: Professors
- V: Courses
- (u,v) in E if Prof. u can
 teach course v


## Find a maximum matching



## Augmenting Path Algorithm



## Reduction to network flow

- More general problem
- Send flow from source to sink
- Flow subject to capacities at edges
- Flow conserved at vertices
- Can solve matching as a flow problem



## Maximum Independent Set

- Given an undirected graph $G=(V, E)$, find a set I of vertices such that there are no edges between vertices of I
- Find a set I as large as possible



## Find a Maximum Independent Set



Verification: Prove the graph has an independent set of size 10


## Key characteristic

- Hard to find a solution
- Easy to verify a solution once you have one
- Other problems like this
- Hamiltonian circuit
- Clique
- Subset sum
- Graph coloring


## NP-Completeness

- Theory of Hard Problems
- A large number of problems are known to be equivalent
- Very elegant theory


## Are there even harder problems?

- Simple game:
- Players alternating selecting nodes in a graph
- Score points associated with node
- Remove nodes neighbors
- When neither can move, player with most points wins




## Competitive Facility Location

- Choose location for a facility
- Value associated with placement
- Restriction on placing facilities too close together
- Competitive
- Different companies place facilities
- E.g., KFC and McDonald's


## Complexity theory

- These problems are P-Space complete instead of NP-Complete
- Appear to be much harder
- No obvious certificate
- G has a Maximum Independent Set of size 10
- Player 1 wins by at least 10 points


# An NP-Complete problem from Digital Public Health 



- ASHAs use Pico projectors to show health videos to Mothers' groups
- Limited number of Pico projectors, so ASHAs must travel to where the Pico projector is stored
- Identify storage locations
 for $k$ Pico projectors to minimize the maximum distance an ASHA must travel



## Summary

- Scheduling
- Weighted Scheduling
- Bipartite Matching
- Maximum Independent Set
- Competitive Scheduling

