

# Making Decisions

CSE 592 Winter 2003  
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## Today

- Making Simple Decisions
- Making Sequential Decisions
  - Planning under uncertainty
- Reinforcement Learning
  - Learning to act based on punishments and rewards

### Outline


- ◇ Rational preferences
- ◇ Utilities
- ◇ Money
- ◇ Multiattribute utilities
- ◇ Decision networks
- ◇ Value of information

Chapter 16 2

### Preferences

An agent chooses among prizes ( $A, B$ , etc.) and lotteries, i.e., situations with uncertain prizes

Lottery  $L = [p, A; (1-p), B]$



Notation:

- $A \succ B$      $A$  preferred to  $B$
- $A \sim B$     indifference between  $A$  and  $B$
- $A \not\succeq B$      $B$  not preferred to  $A$

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### Rational preferences

Idea: preferences of a rational agent must obey constraints.  
Rational preferences  $\Rightarrow$  behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

Constraints:

- Orderability**  
 $(A \succ B) \vee (B \succ A) \vee (A \sim B)$
- Transitivity**  
 $(A \succ B) \wedge (B \succ C) \Rightarrow (A \succ C)$
- Continuity**  
 $A \succ B \succ C \Rightarrow \exists p [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim B$
- Substitutability**  
 $A \sim B \Rightarrow [p, A; 1-p, C] \sim [p, B; 1-p, C]$
- Monotonicity**  
 $A \succ B \Rightarrow (p \geq q \Leftrightarrow [p, A; 1-p, B] \succeq [q, A; 1-q, B])$


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### Rational preferences contd.

Violating the constraints leads to self-evident irrationality

For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all its money

- If  $B \succ C$ , then an agent who has  $C$  would pay (say) 1 cent to get  $B$
- If  $A \succ B$ , then an agent who has  $B$  would pay (say) 1 cent to get  $A$
- If  $C \succ A$ , then an agent who has  $A$  would pay (say) 1 cent to get  $C$



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### Maximizing expected utility

Theorem (Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944):  
 Given preferences satisfying the constraints  
 there exists a real-valued function  $U$  such that

$$U(A) \geq U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succsim B$$

$$U([p_1, S_1; \dots; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$$

MEU principle:  
 Choose the action that maximizes expected utility

Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU)  
 without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities  
 E.g., a lookup table for perfect tactician

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### Utilities

Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers?

Standard approach to assessment of human utilities:  
 compare a given state  $A$  to a standard lottery  $L_p$  that has  
 "best possible prize"  $u_T$  with probability  $p$   
 "worst possible catastrophe"  $u_L$  with probability  $(1-p)$   
 adjust lottery probability  $p$  until  $A \sim L_p$

pay \$30 ~  $L$ 

- 0.999999 → continue as before
- 0.000001 → instant death

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### Utility scales

Normalized utilities:  $u_T = 1.0, u_L = 0.0$

Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death  
 useful for Russian roulette, paying to reduce product risks, etc.

QALYs: quality-adjusted life years  
 useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk

Note: behavior is invariant w.r.t. +ve linear transformation  
 $U'(x) = k_1 U(x) + k_2$  where  $k_1 > 0$

With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only  
 ordinal utility can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes

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### Student group utility

For each  $x$ , adjust  $p$  until half the class votes for lottery ( $M=10,000$ )

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### Money

Money does not behave as a utility function

Given a lottery  $L$  with expected monetary value  $EMV(L)$ ,  
 usually  $U(L) < U(EMV(L))$ , i.e., people are risk-averse

Utility curve: for what probability  $p$  am I indifferent between a prize  $x$  and  
 a lottery  $[p, \$M; (1-p), \$0]$  for large  $M$ ?

Typical empirical data, extrapolated with risk-prone behavior:

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### Decision networks

Add action nodes and utility nodes to belief networks  
 to enable rational decision making

Algorithm:  
 For each value of action node  
 compute expected value of utility node given action, evidence  
 Return MEU action

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### Preference structure: Deterministic

$X_1$  and  $X_2$  preferentially independent of  $X_3$  iff preference between  $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$  and  $(x'_1, x'_2, x_3)$  does not depend on  $x_3$

E.g., (Noise, Cost, Safety):  
 (20,000 suffer, \$4.6 billion, 0.06 deaths/mpm) vs.  
 (70,000 suffer, \$4.2 billion, 0.06 deaths/mpm)

Theorem (Leontief, 1947): if every pair of attributes is P.I. of its complement, then every subset of attributes is P.I. of its complement: mutual P.I.

Theorem (Debreu, 1960): mutual P.I.  $\Rightarrow \exists$  additive value function:  
 $V(S) = \sum_i V_i(X_i(S))$

Hence assess  $n$  single-attribute functions; often a good approximation

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### Value of information

Idea: compute value of acquiring each possible piece of evidence  
 Can be done directly from decision network

Example: buying oil drilling rights  
 Two blocks  $A$  and  $B$ , exactly one has oil, worth  $k$   
 Prior probabilities 0.5 each, mutually exclusive  
 Current price of each block is  $k/2$   
 "Consultant" offers accurate survey of  $A$ . Fair price?

Solution: compute expected value of information  
 = expected value of best action given the information  
 minus expected value of best action without information

Survey may say "oil in  $A$ " or "no oil in  $A$ ", prob. 0.5 each (given!)  
 =  $[0.5 \times \text{value of "buy A" given "oil in A"}]$   
 +  $0.5 \times \text{value of "buy B" given "no oil in A"}]$   
 - 0  
 =  $(0.5 \times k/2) + (0.5 \times k/2) - 0 = k/2$

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### Qualitative behaviors

a) Choice is obvious, information worth little  
 b) Choice is nonobvious, information worth a lot  
 c) Choice is nonobvious, information worth little

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## Summary







- Rational preferences yields utility theory
- MEU: maximize expected utility
  - Highest expected reward over time
  - Not only possible decision rule!
- Can map non-linear quantities (e.g. money) to linear utilities
- Influence diagrams = Bayes net + decision nodes: MEU
- Can compute value of gaining information
- Preferential independence yields utility functions that are linear combinations of state attributes

## Break

### Outline

- ◇ Decision problems
- ◇ Value iteration
- ◇ Policy iteration

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### Policy iteration (Howard, 1960)

Idea: search for optimal policy and utility values simultaneously

Algorithm:

- $\pi \leftarrow$  an arbitrary initial policy
- repeat until no change in  $\pi$
- compute utilities given  $\pi$
- update  $\pi$  as if utilities were correct (i.e., local MEU)

To compute utilities given a fixed  $\pi$ :

$$U(i) = R(i) + \sum_j U(j)M_{ij}^{\pi(i)} \quad \text{for all } i$$

i.e.,  $n$  simultaneous linear equations in  $n$  unknowns, solve in  $O(n^3)$

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### What if I live forever? (digression)

Using the additive definition of utilities,  $U(i)$ s are infinite!  
 Moreover, value iteration fails to terminate  
 How should we compare two infinite lifetimes?

- 1) Discounting: future rewards are discounted at rate  $\gamma \leq 1$   
 $U([s_0, \dots, s_{\infty}]) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(s_t)$   
 Maximum utility bounded above by  $R_{\max}/(1-\gamma)$   
 Smaller  $\gamma \Rightarrow$  shorter horizon
- 2) Maximize system gain = average reward per time step  
 Theorem: optimal policy has constant gain after initial transient  
 E.g., taxi driver's daily scheme cruising for passengers

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### Error Bounds

- Error between true/estimated value of a state reduced by discount factor  $\lambda$  at each iteration
  - Exponentially fast convergence
  - But still takes a long time if  $\lambda$  close to 1
- Optimal policy often found long before state utility estimates converge

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### What's Hard About MDP's?

- MDP's are only hard to solve if the state space is large
  - Suppose a state is described by a set of propositional variables (e.g., probabilistic version of STRIPS planning)
  - Current research topic: performing value or policy iteration directly on a (small) representation of a large state space
    - Dan Weld & Mausam 2003

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### What's Hard About MDP's?

- MDP's are only hard to solve if the state space is large
  - Suppose world is only partially observed
  - Agent assigns a probability distribution over possible values to each variable
  - "State" for the MDP becomes the agent's state of belief – exponentially larger!
  - No truly practical algorithms for general POMDP's (yet)

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### Multi-Agent MDP's

- Payoff matrix – specify rewards 2 or more agents receive after each performs an action

	Alice: testify	Alice: refuse
Bob: testify	A=5, B=5	A=-10, B=0
Bob: refuse	A=0, B=-10	A=1, B=1

- Game theory – von Neuman – every zero-sum game has an optimal mixed (stochastic) strategy

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
## Summary

- Markov Decision Processes provide a general way of reasoning about sequential decision problems
- Solved by linear programming, value iteration, or policy iteration
- Discounting future rewards guarantees convergence of value/policy iteration
- Requires complete model of the world (i.e. the state transition function)
  - MPD – complete observations
  - POMDP – partial observations
- Large state spaces problematic

## Break

## Reinforcement Learning

- “Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections with that situation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur. The greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening of the bond.” (Thorndike, 1911, p. 244)



## The Reinforcement Learning Scenario

- How is learning to act possible when...
  - Actions have non-deterministic effects, that are initially unknown
  - Rewards or punishments come infrequently, at the end of long sequences of actions
  - The learner must decide what actions to take
  - The world is large and complex

## RL Techniques

- Temporal-difference learning
  - Learns a utility function on states or on [state,action] pairs
  - Similar to backpropagation – treats the difference between expected / actual reward as an error signal, that is propagated backward in time
- Exploration functions
  - Balance exploration / exploitation
- Function approximation
  - Compress a large state space into a small one
  - Linear function approximation, neural nets, ...
  - Generalization

## Passive RL

- Given policy  $\pi$ , estimate  $U^\pi(s)$
- Not given transition matrix or reward function!
- Epochs: training sequences

$(1,1) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (1,3) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (1,3) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (1,1) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (2,2) \rightarrow (3,2) \perp$   
 $(1,1) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (1,3) \rightarrow (2,3) \rightarrow (2,2) \rightarrow (2,3) \rightarrow (3,3) \perp$   
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 $(1,1) \rightarrow (2,1) \rightarrow (1,1) \rightarrow (1,2) \rightarrow (2,2) \rightarrow (3,2) \perp$

### Approaches

- **Direct estimation**
  - Estimate  $U^\pi(s)$  as average total reward of epochs containing  $s$  (calculating from  $s$  to end of epoch)
  - Requires huge amount of data — does not take advantage of Bellman constraints!
    - Expected utility of a state = its own reward + expected utility of its successor states

### Approaches

- **Adaptive Dynamic Programming**
  - Requires fully observable environment
  - Estimate transition function  $M$  from training data
  - Apply modified policy iteration to solve Bellman equation:
 
$$U^\pi = R + \gamma \sum_{s'} M_{s,s'} U^\pi(s')$$
  - Drawbacks: requires complete observations, and you don't usually need value of all states

### Temporal Difference Learning

- **Ideas**
  - Do backups on a per-epoch basis
  - Don't even try to estimate entire transition function!
  - For each transition from  $s$  to  $s'$ , update:
 
$$U^\pi(s) \leftarrow U^\pi(s) + \alpha (R(s) + \lambda U^\pi(s') - U^\pi(s))$$

### Example:

### Q-Learning

- Version of TD-learning where instead of learning a value function on states, we learn one on [state,action] pairs
 
$$Q(a,s) \leftarrow Q(a,s) + \alpha (R(s) + \max_a Q(a,s') - Q(a,s))$$
- Why do this?

### Active Reinforcement Learning

- Suppose agent has to create its own policy while learning
- **First approach:**
  - Start with arbitrary policy
  - Apply Q-Learning
  - New policy/ in state  $s$ , choose action  $a$  that maximizes  $Q(a,s)$
  - Problem?

### Exploration Functions

- Too easily stuck in non-optimal space
- Simple fix: with fixed probability perform a random action
- Better: increase estimated expected value of states that have been rarely explored
- “Exploration versus exploitation tradeoff”

### Function Approximation

- Problem of large state spaces remain
  - Never enough training data!
  - Want to generalize what has been learned to new situations
- Idea:
  - Replace large state table by a smaller, parameterized function
  - Updating the value of state will change the value assigned to many other similar states

### Linear Function Approximation

- Represent  $U(s)$  as a weighted sum of features (basis functions) of  $s$

$$U_{\theta}(s) = \theta_1 f_1(s) + \theta_2 f_2(s) + \dots + \theta_n f_n(s)$$

- Update each parameter separately, e.g:

$$\theta_i \leftarrow \theta_i + \alpha (R(s) + \gamma U_{\theta}(s) - U_{\theta}(s)) \frac{\partial U_{\theta}(s)}{\partial \theta_i}$$

### Neural Nets

- Neural nets can be used to create powerful function approximators
- Can become unstable (unlike linear functions)
- For TD-learning, apply difference signal to neural net output and perform back-propagation

### Example

### Demo



## Summary

- Use reinforcement learning when model of world is unknown and/or rewards are delayed
- Temporal difference learning is a simple and efficient training rule
- Q-learning eliminates need to ever use an explicit model of the transition function
- Large state spaces can (sometimes) be handled by function approximation, using linear functions or neural nets