Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption

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Joint work with Seny Kamara

Encrypted Cloud Backup

Cloud backup

- Users want to back up their data
- The cloud provides storage
- Privacy, integrity, and confidentiality
 - But servers learn much about users this way
 - Honest-but-curious server can read everything
 - Malicious server can make arbitrary changes
- Naïve solution: store all data encrypted
 - User keeps key and decrypts locally
 - Problems: key management, search, cloud computation

Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE)

- SSE solves the search problem
 - Encrypt an index
 - User keeps key and generates search tokens
 - Server can use tokens to search encrypted index
- Practical implementations need update
 - Current impls do not have efficient update
 - Either no supported update operations
 - Or each word has size linear in all documents
- We provide two schemes with efficient update
 - 1. Update (add or delete) per word/doc pair
 - 2. Update (add or delete) per doc

Overview

Introduction

- Dynamic SSE Protocols
- Security Proofs
- Implementation


The Encrypted Search Problem

- User has collection d_1, d_2, \dots, d_m of documents
 - *d* is a document identifier
 - Each document d has set of unique words W_d
 - Set of all unique words: $w_1, w_2, ..., w_n$
- Goal: Produce an encrypted index with ops
 - Search(w): returns encrypted doc ids
 - $Add(d, W_d)$: adds the doc id with word set
 - Delete(d): deletes the doc id and all words
 - Expand(): expands the index




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


CGKO

- SSE scheme without update operations
- Main idea:
 - Each word is mapped to a token (under PRF)
 - Tokens map to an initial position in encrypted array
 - Each position points to next element in list
- The large encrypted, randomized array hides the document count for each word
- In original form, only secure against nonadaptive adversaries
- Assume honest-but-curious server

Modified CGKO

- index : $f_{k_c}(w) \rightarrow \langle start \rangle \bigoplus f_{k_b}(w)$
- list entry : $Enc_{k_w}(next), Enc_{k_e}(d)$



- W, k_c , k_b , k_g . $k_w = KDF_{k_g}(w)$
- construct token $f_{k_c}(w), f_{k_b}(w), k_w$




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


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
• w, k_c , k_b , k_g . $k_w = KDF_{k_g}(w)$ • construct token $f_{k_c}(w)$, $f_{k_h}(w)$, k_w




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
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- construct token $f_{k_c}(w), f_{k_b}(w), k_w$



List Patching

To delete an entry (x), need


- Location of entry to delete
- Location of next (n) and prev (p) entries (if any)
- Use XOR encryption for list pointers



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
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
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



Deletion index


To patch the data structure


- E.g., pulling a document out of a list
- And need a structure to index directly into the lists
- Add deletion index
 - Index: $f_{k_c}(d) \rightarrow \langle start \rangle \bigoplus f_{k_b}(d)$
 - $r, r', r'', \langle n_d, dn_x, dp_x \rangle \bigoplus f_{k_d}(r), \langle x, p, n \rangle \bigoplus f_{k_d}(r'), f_{k_c}(w) \bigoplus f_{k_d}(r'')$
 - list structure uses n_d to point to next word for d
 - $\circ dn_x$ and dp_x point to del index entries for n and p
 - 1–1 correspondence between list entries

















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 - revealing unused would reveal word * doc
 - user must keep track of freelist count




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
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



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



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




















Add a Document


(doc tokens), (freelist tokens), word count
per word: (word tokens), (freelist mask), templates





(doc tokens), doc key, (freelist tokens), count
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



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


 $f_{k_c}(d)$




Index Extension

- Index size is fixed at generation time
 - So, add to free list for expansion




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
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A Small Example: Indexes

Index




 $\mathbf{Main \ Index}\ M$

 $f_{k_c}(w_1) \longrightarrow (4 \parallel 1) \oplus f_{k_b}(w_1)$ $f_{k_c}(w_2) \longrightarrow (0 \parallel 2) \oplus f_{k_b}(w_2)$ $f_{k_c}(w_3) \longrightarrow (5 \parallel 0) \oplus f_{k_b}(w_3)$ $f_{k_c}(\text{free}) \longrightarrow 6 \oplus f_{k_b}(\text{free})$

Deletion Index I $f_{k_c}(d_1) \longrightarrow 1 \oplus f_{k_b}(d_1)$ $f_{k_c}(d_2) \longrightarrow 5 \oplus f_{k_b}(d_2)$ $f_{k_c}(d_3) \longrightarrow 4 \oplus f_{k_b}(d_3)$


A Small Example: Arrays

Main Index M



Deletion Index I

 $egin{aligned} &f_{k_c}(d_1)\longrightarrow 1\oplus f_{k_b}(d_1)\ &f_{k_c}(d_2)\longrightarrow 5\oplus f_{k_b}(d_2)\ &f_{k_c}(d_3)\longrightarrow 4\oplus f_{k_b}(d_3) \end{aligned}$



Word-Based Deletion

- Deletion index uses doc/word pairs:
 - No lists of words per doc
 - $f_{k_c}(d,w) \rightarrow r, r', r'', \langle x, p, n \rangle \oplus f_{k_{d,w}}(r), f_{k_c}(d_p, w_p) \oplus f_{k_{d,w}}(r'), f_{k_c}(d_n, w_n) \oplus f_{k_{d,w}}(r'')$
- Algorithms similar
 - Search identical
 - Add puts new word on front of list
 - Delete patches to pull word out of list
 - Extension identical

Tradeoffs


- Word-Based Update
 - Update token linear in number of word changes
 - Hides number of unique words in document
 - Uses less space for index
 - But requires keeping track of diffs on disk
- Doc-Based Update
 - Stateless for client (except freelist count)
 - But reveals the unique words in old and new docs
- We currently use Doc-Based Update
 - Cost of keeping diffs outweighs value of hiding

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Security Proofs

- Adaptive Simulatability
 - Σ = (Gen, Index, TrapS, Search, Retrieve, TrapA, Add, TrapD, Delete, ExtendIndex) is a dynamic SSE scheme




Leakage

- Searchable Symmetric Encryption leaks info
 - Query pattern: unique terms and result counts
 - Access pattern: which documents are retrieved
- Our algorithm leaks a little more
 - unique ID for words in added and deleted docs
 - Update pattern: add to existing, pos of delete
 - tail of the free list
 - amount of index expansion
 - when the index is full


Proof Outline

- Index Generation and Expansion: random
- Search: given number of results
 - If seen search (+ any updates), then repeat
 - Otherwise, choose a random index entry
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 - Program random oracle to "decrypt" list (k_w)



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Proof Outline: Add and Delete

- Add: given unique IDs of added words
 - Find random locations and setup freelist tokens
 - Choose random index entry and get word tokens
 - Set masks to XOR to chosen pattern
- Delete: given unique IDs of deleted words
 - Choose deletion locations (from prev or random)
 - Choose index entry to delete (from prev or random)
 - Program random oracle to decrypt chosen pattern (k_d)

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Performance

- Prototype doc-based scheme in C++
- Intel Xeon x64 2.26 GHz with Win 2008 R2
 - Zipf, Docs, Email datasets
 - 500k to 1.5M doc/word pairs
- Results
 - \circ Generation (doc/word pair): 40 μs (c)
 - Search (doc): 8 µs (s)
 - Add (word): 35 μs (c), 2 μs (s)
 - Delete (word): 3 µs (c), 24 µs (s)

Related SSE Schemes

[CGKO06]

- Efficient search
- Provides an adaptive scheme in plain model
- Doesn't provide any update properties

[SLDH09]

- Efficient update via XOR encryption
- Uses padded lists: linear in number of docs
- Large storage cost: O(|w| |d|)

Conclusions

- Dynamic SSE algorithms
- Add and Delete use XOR encryption to modify index
- Practical for real-world applications
- Can trade off leakage for server operations