CSE 484 / CSE M 584 (Spring 2012)

Symmetric Cryptography

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Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Goals for Today

- Cryptography
- Also: Lab part 1 due today
  - Don't all increase in complexity
  - Read recommended readings

Encrypting a Large Message

- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size



- What should we do?

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode



- Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
- No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Last cipherblock depends on entire plaintext
  - Still does not guarantee integrity

CBC Mode: Decryption



ECB vs. CBC

[Picture due to Bart Preneel]



Information Leakage in ECB Mode

[Wikipedia]



CBC and Electronic Voting



Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:

```
DesCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data,
        totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)
```

Counter (CTR) Mode: Encryption



- Identical blocks of plaintext encrypted differently
- Still does not guarantee integrity
- Fragile if ctr repeats

CTR Mode: Decryption



Achieving Privacy (Symmetric)

Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy.



When Is an Encryption Scheme "Secure"?

- Hard to recover the key?
  - What if attacker can learn plaintext without learning the key?
- Hard to recover plaintext from ciphertext?
  - What if attacker learns some bits or some function of bits?
- Fixed mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts?
  - What if attacker sees two identical ciphertexts and infers that the corresponding plaintexts are identical?
  - Implication: encryption must be randomized or stateful

How Can a Cipher Be Attacked?

- Assume that the attacker knows the encryption algorithm and wants to learn information about some ciphertext
- Main question: what else does attacker know?
  - Depends on the application in which cipher is used!
- Ciphertext-only attack
- Known-plaintext attack (stronger)
  - Knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
- Chosen-plaintext attack (even stronger)
  - Can obtain ciphertext for any plaintext of his choice
- Chosen-ciphertext attack (very strong)
  - Can decrypt any ciphertext <u>except</u> the target
  - Sometimes very realistic model

Defining Security (Not Required)

- Attacker does not know the key
- He chooses as many plaintexts as he wants, and learns the corresponding ciphertexts
- When ready, he picks two plaintexts M_0 and M_1
  - He is even allowed to pick plaintexts for which he previously learned ciphertexts!
- He receives either a ciphertext of M_0, or a ciphertext of M_1
- He wins if he guesses correctly which one it is

Defining Security (Not Required)

- Idea: attacker should not be able to learn even a single bit of the encrypted plaintext
- Define Enc(M_0,M_1,b) to be a function that returns encrypted M_b

  0 or 1

  - Given two plaintexts, Enc returns a ciphertext of one or the other depending on the value of bit b
  - Think of Enc as a magic box that computes ciphertexts on attacker's demand. He can obtain a ciphertext of any plaintext M by submitting $M_0=M_1=M$, or he can try to learn even more by submitting $M_0 \neq M_1$.
- Attacker's goal is to learn just one bit b

Chosen-Plaintext Security (Not Required)

- Consider two experiments (A is the attacker)

Experiment 0

A interacts with Enc(-,-,0) and outputs bit d

Experiment 1

A interacts with Enc(-,-,1) and outputs bit d

  - Identical except for the value of the secret bit
  - d is attacker's guess of the secret bit

If A "knows" secret bit, he should be able to make his output depend on it

- Attacker's advantage is defined as

| Prob(A outputs 1 in Exp0) - Prob(A outputs 1 in Exp1)) |

- Encryption scheme is chosen-plaintext secure if this advantage is negligible for any efficient A

"Simple" Example (Not Required)

- Any deterministic, stateless symmetric encryption scheme is insecure
  - Attacker can easily distinguish encryptions of different plaintexts from encryptions of identical plaintexts
  - This includes ECB mode of common block ciphers!

Attacker A interacts with Enc(-,-,b)

Let X,Y be any two different plaintexts

$C_1 \leftarrow$ Enc(X,Y,b); $C_2 \leftarrow$ Enc(Y,Y,b);

If $C_1=C_2$ then b=1 else say b=0

- The advantage of this attacker A is 1

Prob(A outputs 1 if b=0)=0 Prob(A outputs 1 if b=1)=1

Why Hide Everything?

- Leaking even a little bit of information about the plaintext can be disastrous
- Electronic voting
  - 2 candidates on the ballot (1 bit to encode the vote)
  - If ciphertext leaks the parity bit of the encrypted plaintext, eavesdropper learns the entire vote
- Also, want a strong definition, that implies others

Birthday attacks

- Are there two people in the first 1/3 of this classroom that have the same birthday?
  - Yes?
  - No?

Birthday attacks

- Why is this important for cryptography?
  - 365 days in a year (366 some years)
    - Pick one person. To find another person with same birthday would take on the order of 365/2 = 182.5 people
    - Expect "collision" -- two people with same birthday -- with a room of only 23 people
    - For simplicity, approximate when we expect a collision as the square root of 365.
  - 2^{128} different 128-bit keys
    - Pick one key at random. To exhaustively search for this key requires trying on average 2^{127} keys.
    - Expect a "collision" after selecting approximately 2^{64} random keys.
    - 64 bits of security against collision attacks, not 128 bits.

Achieving Integrity (Symmetric)

Message authentication schemes: A tool for protecting integrity.

(Also called message authentication codes or MACs.)



CBC Mode: Encryption



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CBC-MAC



- Not secure when system may MAC messages of different lengths.
  - NIST recommends a derivative called CMAC (not required)